Uniform Resource Locator Protection Scheme for the Mitigation of Man-In-The-Middle Stripping Attacks

Abstract

Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks reduce Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), compromising network communications to potential exploitation. Attackers exploit application-layer vulnerabilities, and the attack often occurs on LAN. This study addresses the problem by introducing a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) protection mechanism that combines encryption with secure key exchange.

A browser built with Python and PyQt5 encrypts URLs before transmission. The router decrypts, processes, re-encrypts, and returns data securely. The Diffie–Hellman algorithm generates a new session key for each connection, and the Advanced Encryption Standard with Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM) technique to encrypt.

The system was tested in a VMware host-only environment under four scenarios: normal use, active attacker, system-only, and active attacker with the system enabled. Packet capture and timing analysis evaluated security and performance. The scheme achieved a 100% prevention rate against HTTPS downgrades. Intercepted traffic appeared as unreadable ciphertext. Average execution time increased from 0.05 seconds to 0.11 seconds due to encryption, but it did not affect stability.

This research improves application-layer security independently and offers a concrete defense against MITM stripping attacks. In conclusion, the proposed methodology provides a pragmatic and effective strategy for protecting URL traffic in vulnerable local network environments.